DAOhaus · interactive mechanism simulation

Applicants stake tribute for shares → sponsored proposals go to a member vote → passed proposals enter a grace period, during which any dissenting member can ragequit and exit with their exact pro-rata slice of the treasury before execution → surviving proposals settle into the treasury and the DAO's Minion can execute external calls (grants, DeFi, hires).
Applicants tribute proposals Proposal queue sponsored, queued Member vote yes/no, 70% pass Grace period ragequit window: 3s DAO treasury (Safe) 0.0 ETH 10,000 shares+loot Minion execution external calls / grants Ragequit exit burn shares → pro-rata ETH out
Members
42
Shares + loot outstanding
10,000
Treasury
120.0 ETH
Proposals passed / submitted
0 / 0
Ragequits triggered
0
Parameters — edit me
6 ETH
70%
3s
8%
1.2/s
Controls

Illustrative simulation. Modeled on DAOhaus's Moloch-framework mechanism (shares/loot, tribute proposals, sponsored voting, grace-period ragequit, minion/Zodiac execution) — proposal sizes, timing, and vote outcomes are randomized for visualization, not live onchain data. Drag the sliders to see how dissent and pass rates change the DAO's trajectory, or trigger a hostile proposal to see ragequit defend the treasury. Part of The Onchain Experiment Atlas.