Hashflow · interactive mechanism simulation

A trader requests a quote → competing market makers sign firm off-chain prices → the winning signed quote settles atomically on-chain, exactly as quoted (zero slippage, no room for sandwich attacks). Drag the parameters to see the RFQ flywheel respond, or trigger the 2023 approval exploit.
Trader requests a swap Market makers (RFQ) 4 makers competing MM inventory own pools, off-chain priced Winning signed quote ~4 bps · fixed, expires fast Settlement contract verifies signature, fills atomically 0.00% realized slippage MEV searcher no live price to sandwich — blocked Approval exploit dormant since Jun 2023 white-hat made users whole
Quotes requested
0
Trades settled
0
Volume settled
$0
MEV attempts blocked
0
Parameters — edit me
4
4 bps
$6,000
1.4/s
Controls

Illustrative simulation. Reflects the researched Hashflow mechanism: traders request quotes, professional market makers sign firm off-chain prices, and Hashflow's contracts verify the signature and settle atomically at the quoted price — no on-chain curve to move mid-trade, so MEV sandwiching has nothing to attack. The exploit button re-enacts the June 2023 approval-path incident (~$600–640K drained, then made whole by a white-hat-coordinated recovery). Trade sizes, timing, and maker counts are randomized for visualization — not live onchain data. Part of The Onchain Experiment Atlas.