What it is
Moloch v2 is a stripped-down DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) framework built around one core guarantee: any member can leave at any time and take their proportional share of the treasury with them, before a proposal they oppose executes. This "rage quit" right means members never have to trust that the majority won't misuse funds — they can exit rather than be forced to go along. It's most commonly used for grant-making DAOs and small investment clubs pooling capital toward shared bets.
How it works
- Members join by contributing capital (ETH, stablecoins, or a specified token) and receive voting shares and/or loot (non-voting economic shares) in proportion to their contribution, approved by an existing member vote.
- Any member can submit a proposal: to fund a grant, admit a new member, or make some other treasury action, specifying the amount and recipient.
- Proposals enter a voting period where members vote yes/no weighted by their shares, followed by a grace period before execution.
- During the grace period, any member who disagrees with a passing proposal can "rage quit" — burning their shares and withdrawing their proportional slice of the treasury before the proposal's funds move.
- If a proposal passes and the grace period ends without enough members quitting to change the outcome, the proposal executes and funds move from the shared treasury (called "the guild bank") to the proposal's target.
- Because shares are minted only through approved proposals, the total pool of ownership grows deliberately, and dilution is always visible and votable in advance.
Why designers use it
- Gives members a credible exit option instead of relying purely on majority rule, which reduces the risk of capture by a faction with funds they didn't contribute.
- Simple enough to audit and fork — the whole logic fits in a small, well-reviewed contract, making it a popular base for new DAOs rather than building governance from scratch.
- Aligns incentives for pooled-capital groups (grant DAOs, investment clubs) where members want collective decision-making without giving up individual control over their own capital.
- The grace period before execution creates a built-in check: bad proposals can be "voted against" economically via rage quit even if they win the vote.
Failure modes
- Rage-quit run on the treasury: a controversial proposal can trigger a wave of members quitting simultaneously, draining the treasury and leaving the DAO with too little capital to execute its original plans.
- Low voter turnout / plutocracy: because voting power is proportional to contribution, a small number of large holders can pass proposals that smaller members dislike but can't outvote, only rage quit.
- Guild bank illiquidity: if the treasury holds illiquid or long-locked assets, "sharing" or ragequitting a proportional slice isn't actually straightforward, and members can be stuck.
- Proposal spam: without a meaningful bond or cost to submitting proposals, the DAO can be flooded with low-quality proposals that drown out serious ones.
- Loot/share confusion: mixing voting shares and non-voting loot without clear documentation confuses new members about who actually controls decisions.
What to check before using it
- Confirm the grace period is long enough for members to actually notice and react to a bad proposal before it executes.
- Model what happens to the treasury's composition and liquidity if a significant fraction of members rage quit at once.
- Set a meaningful proposal bond or spam deterrent so the queue doesn't fill with junk.
- Clarify, in member-facing documentation, the difference between voting shares and loot, and who can actually block a proposal.
- Decide how new member admission and share pricing are handled to avoid diluting existing members unfairly.